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We propose an entanglement-based protocol for two people to simultaneously exchange their
messages. We show that the protocol is asymptotically secure against the disturbance attack, the
intercept-and-resend attack and the entangle-and-measure attack. Our protocol is experimentally
feasible within current technologies.
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Sending or/and exchanging secret information has long been desired since language became a tool to communicate.
Up to date the most popular cryptosystem is the RSA protocol [1] whose security is based upon unproven mathematical
assumptions, e.g., it is extremely hard to factorize a large integer. Because such a mathematically difficult task
could be accomplished by an efficient quantum computation algorithm [2], all the RSA-based privacy would be
broken if scalable quantum computers come into being some day. Fortunately enough, however, laws of quantum
mechanics can also be exploited to make provably secure distribution of secret information. This is known as quantum
cryptography. Conventionally the problem reduces to the so called quantum key distribution (see, e.g., [3]) which is
nondeterministic since one never knows which transmitted bits will actually be used and which should be discarded
during the distribution, and the number of discarded bits is at least one half of the total processed bits. Furthermore,
the real message can only be read after the secret key (i.e., a sequence of random bits whose length is equal to that
of the message) is established and shared between the two legitimate parties.
Recently, quite different quantum crytographic scenarios have been proposed [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] for secure commu-
nication without a prior secret key distribution. In particular, the so called ping-pong protocol (PPP) [6] allows
the encoded bit to be decoded instantaneously in each respective transmission run. In other words, the PPP pro-
vides a quantum means of direct and deterministic communication. Nevertheless, the PPP supports only one-way
communication and contains in itself some limitation.
In this letter we first point out a drawback of the original PPP and then improve it towards a protocol, called
quantum dialogue protocol, which enables both legitimate parties (Alice and Bob) to exchange their secret messages
in a direct way, much like in a dialogue.
In the original PPP [6] Bob is provided with a number of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs [10], all in the
entangled state
|Ψ0,0〉ht =
1√
2
(|↓〉h |↑〉t + |↑〉h |↓〉t) , (1)
where h stands for “home”, t for “travel” while |↓〉 and |↑〉 characterize two degrees of freedom of a qubit. In each run
Bob keeps qubit h and “pings” qubit t to Alice. Alice encodes her information by performing Ct0,0 = 1ˆ
t or Ct1,1 = σ
t
z
(σtx,y,z the Pauli matrices) on the qubit t depending on the value of her message bit is “0” or “1”, then “pongs” the
qubit t back to Bob who is able to decode Alice’s secret bit with certainty by a Bell measurement on the ht-pair. This
is a message mode (MM). To check for eavesdropping Alice and Bob sometimes agree to switch to a control mode
(CM) in which Alice measures qubit t in the bases B = {|↓〉 , |↑〉}, then, instead of “ponging”, publicly announces her
measurement outcome to Bob who can probabilistically detect the presence of Eve (the eavesdropper) by measuring
qubit h (also in the bases B) and comparing his measurement outcome with Alice’s.
The serious drawback suffered by the PPP is the following. Since MM operates in a “ping-pong” manner while CM
operates just in a “ping” one, Eve can easily avoid all control runs and manipulate qubits t in MM in such a way as
to totally disturb the message meaning. For that purpose, Eve waits on the pong-route. If a qubit t comes out from
Alice this is surely a run in MM. Eve may simply either measure the qubit t [8] or randomly apply either Ct0,0 or C
t
1,1
on it. In the first situation the entanglement between qubits h and t is destroyed. In the second situation the phase
of the EPR-pair changes randomly. In both situations Eve remains undetected and what Bob decodes is nothing else
but a random sequence of bits that contains no information at all. This is a kind of denial-of-service attacks. Here
we refer to it as disturbance attack for short.
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2To protect against such a disturbance attack we modify the CM as follows. After manipulation of a qubit t Alice
always “pongs” the qubit t back to Bob. The modified CM is a mode in which Alice lets Bob know her encoding
transformation which then allows Bob to detect Eve by analyzing the outcome of his Bell measurement on the EPR-
pair. The point of the modification is that Eve cannot distinguish between MM and CM since both modes now
operate in the same “ping-pong” manner (compare with the original PPP in which MM and CM are distinguishable:
MM is “ping-pong” like but CM is “pong” like).
The modified PPP is good against the disturbance attack mentioned above but it is insecure by the following
intercept-and-resend attack. On the ping-route Eve gets the qubit t and keeps it with her. Afterwards she creates
her own entangled pair in the same state as in Eq. (1), i.e., Eve’s pair state is
|Ψ0,0〉HT =
1√
2
(|↓〉H |↑〉T + |↑〉H |↓〉T ) , (2)
and sends her qubit T to Alice. Alice would take T for t, encodes her message bit by performing an appropriate
transformation as described above and “pongs” the qubit T back to Bob. On the pong-route Eve gets back the
transformed qubit T , carries out a Bell measurement on the HT -pair to learn Alice’s secret bit. By the same Bell
measurement Eve knows the encoding transformation Alice performed on the qubit T . Eve then applies the same
transformation on the qubit t she has kept and “pongs” it back to Bob. Clearly, Alice’s message is readable not only
to Bob but also to Eve and, even worse, Eve’s tampering is absolutely unnoticeable.
To rescue the modified PPP against the intercept-and-resend attack we further improve it in such a way so that
the initial entangled pairs of Bob are not all in the same state |Ψ0,0〉ht but they must be somehow chosen each time
as one among the four mutually orthogonal Bell states |Ψk,l〉ht = Ctk,l |Ψ0,0〉ht where Ct0,0, Ct0,1, Ct1,0 and Ct1,1 denote
1ˆt, σtx, σ
t
y and σ
t
z, respectively. The choice may be random or in some secret fashion unknown to Eve. The latter
alternative suggests a quantum dialogue protocol which will be detailed now.
Suppose that Alice has a secret message consisting of 2N bits [11],
Alice′s message = {(i1, j1), (i2, j2), . . . , (iN , jN )}, (3)
with in, jn ∈ {0, 1} and, Bob has another secret message consisting of 2M bits [11],
Bob′s message = {(k1, l1), (k2, l2), . . . , (kM , lM )}, (4)
with kn, ln ∈ {0, 1}. Without loss of generality we can set N = M [12]. To securely exchange their messages or, in
other words, to carry out a secret dialogue, Bob first produces a large enough number of entangled pairs, all in the
state |Ψ0,0〉ht, Eq. (1). Then Bob and Alice proceed as follows.
1. Set n = 0.
2. Set n = n+ 1. Bob encodes his bits (kn, ln) by applying C
t
kn,ln
on the state |Ψ0,0〉hntn , keeps qubit hn with him
and pings qubit tn to Alice. Then Bob lets Alice know that [13].
3. Alice confirms Bob that she received a qubit [14]. Then she encodes her bits (in, jn) by performing the transfor-
mation Ctin,jn on that qubit and pongs it back to Bob.
4. Having been aware of Alice’s confirmation, Bob performs a Bell measurement on the two qubits [15] with the result
in state |Ψxn,yn〉hntn (xn, yn ∈ [0, 1]), and waits for Alice to tell him that was a run in MM or in CM.
4.1. If it was a MM run, Bob decodes Alice’s bits as (in = |xn − kn|, jn = |yn − ln|), then publicly announces
the values of (xn, yn) to allow Alice also to decode Bob’s bits as (kn = |xn− in|, ln = |yn− jn|). Afterwards
the protocol proceeds to Step 5 if n = N or to Step 2 if n < N .
4.2. If it was a CM run, Alice publicly reveals the value of (in, jn) for Bob to check the eavesdropping: if both
in = |xn − kn| and jn = |yn − ln| hold, the process continues, i.e., Bob sets n = n− 1 and goes to Step 2;
otherwise the process is reinitialized by going to Step 1.
5. The dialogue has been successfully completed.
We now explicitly analyze the quantum dialogue protocol described above. After Bob encodes his bits (k, l) on the
EPR-pair state |Ψ0,0〉ht, the pair state becomes |Ψk,l〉ht, i.e.,
|Ψ0,0〉ht → |Ψk,l〉ht = Ctk,l |Ψ0,0〉ht . (5)
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Cti,jC
t
k,l = φi,j;k,lC
t
i⊕k,j⊕l, (6)
where the ⊕ denotes an addition mod 2 and φi,j;k,l is a phase factor (φi,j;k,l = 1 or ±i depending on the values of
i, j, k, l [16]). Further, after Alice’s encoding, the state |Ψk,l〉ht of the qubit pair is transformed as
|Ψk,l〉ht → Cti,j |Ψk,l〉ht = Cti,jCtk,l |Ψ0,0〉ht = φi,j;k,l |Ψi⊕k,j⊕l〉ht . (7)
Clearly, if the outcome of Bob’s Bell measurement is (x, y), then Bob can easily decode Alice’s bits as (i = |x −
k|, j = |y − l|) because Bob knows his bits (k, l). At the same time, Alice can also easily decode Bob’s bits as
(k = |x − i|, l = |y − j|) because Alice knows her bits (i, j) and the values of (x, y) broadcasted by Bob. The crucial
merit is that, although Eve knows (x, y) as well (through Bob’s public broadcasting), she can by no means, except
a pure guess, read either Alice’s or Bob’s message because none of the bits (i, j, k, l) are known to her. By the same
reason Eve faces a detection probability of 3/4 per CM run in both the disturbance attack and the intercept-and-
resend attack. Let N be the total number of the protocol runs among which there are NMM runs in MM and NCM
runs in CM: N = NMM+NCM . The probability of a CM run is thus c = NCM/N . For N = 1, 2, 3, . . . the probability
of detecting Eve is 3c/4, 3c/4+ 3c(1− 3c/4)/4, 3c/4 + 3c(1− 3c/4)/4+ 3c(1− 3c/4)2/4, . . ., respectively. Therefore,
after N runs the total detection probability is
D =
3c
4
N−1∑
n=0
(
1− 3c
4
)n
= 1−
(
1− 3c
4
)N
. (8)
For messages of 2N bits (see Eqs. (3) and (4)) to be entirely exchanged, Alice and Bob need NMM = N runs in MM.
Taking this into account we can re-express Eq. (8) in terms of N (i.e., of message half-length) as
D = 1−
(
1− 3c
4
) N
1−c
. (9)
Transparently, for any possible value of c (0 < c < 1), D tends to unity in the limit of large N (long message). The
greater the value of c the higher the speed at which D approaches unity.
Besides the two above-discussed attacks, there is another kind of attack by which Eve could gain a partial infor-
mation. Let us call it entangle-and-measure attack which acts in the following way. Eve prepares an ancilla in the
initial state |χ〉e and waits in the ping-route. After Bob applies Ctk,l Eve entangles her ancilla with the qubit t by
performing an unitary operation Ete defined as
Ete |↓〉t |χ〉e = α |↓〉t |χ0〉e + β |↑〉t |χ1〉e , (10)
Ete |↑〉t |χ〉e = α |↑〉t |χ0〉e + β |↓〉t |χ1〉e , (11)
with α, β (assumed to be real) satisfying the normalization condition α2 + β2 = 1 and {|χ0〉e , |χ1〉e} being the pure
orthonormalized ancilla’s states uniquely determined by the unitary operation Ete. Subsequently, Eve lets the qubit
t going on to Alice. The total system state (ht-pair plus ancilla) before reaching Alice is
|Φping〉hte = EteCtk,l |Ψ0,0〉ht |χ〉e
= α |Ψk,l〉ht |χ0〉e + βφ0,1;k,l |Ψk,1⊕l〉ht |χ1〉e . (12)
On the pong-route, after Alice encodes her bits by Cti,j Eve measures her ancilla in attempt to gain Alice’s information.
Since the total system state at the measurement time is given by
|Φpong〉hte = Cti,j |Φping〉hte
= αφi,j;k,l |Ψi⊕k,j⊕l〉ht |χ0〉e + βφ0,1;k,lφi,j;k,1⊕l |Ψi⊕k,j⊕1⊕l〉ht |χ1〉e , (13)
Eve conceals herself if her measurement outcome ends up with |χ0〉e (with probability α2). However, if she finds |χ1〉e
(with probability β2), then |Φpong〉hte collapses into |Ψi⊕k,j⊕1⊕l〉ht which is orthogonal to |Ψi⊕k,j⊕l〉ht. Obviously,
this enables Bob to detect Eve in a CM run. It is also clear that the detection probability of the entangle-and-measure
attack is β2 per CM run and cβ2 per protocol run. Therefore the proposed dialogue protocol is also asymptotically
secure against the entangle-and-measure attack since its total detection probability D′,
D′ = 1− (1 − cβ2) N1−c , (14)
4approaches unity in the long-message limit for any possible values of c and β.
To evaluate how much information Eve could gain when there is no control run we calculate the von Neumann
entropy S(ρe) of the Eve’s reduced density matrix ρe. From Eq. (13), we obtain
ρe = Trht
(|Φpong〉hte 〈Φpong|) = α2 |χ0〉e 〈χ0|+ β2 |χ1〉e 〈χ1| . (15)
Hence
S(ρe) = −(1− β2) log2(1 − β2)− β2 log2 β2. (16)
It follows from Eq. (16) that S > 0 iff β2 > 0 (β2 ∈ [0, 0.5]), i.e., iff D′ > 0. This means that any attempt to steal
information causes a non-zero detection probability. To be undetected Eve should set β = 0. But by doing so no
entanglement exists between the qubit t and the ancilla and, as a consequence, absolutely no information is leaked to
Eve.
In conclusion, we have proposed a quantum protocol for two legitimate parties to simultaneously exchange their
secret messages. It modifies and improves the existing ping-pong protocol [6] making subtle use of the superdense
coding [17] to double the quantum channel capacity. In fact, by the wise manipulation of two public bits (x, y)
combined with a single-qubit t in a state of two entangled qubits, in a MM run four secret bits (i, j, k, l) can be
processed: each party is able at the same time to send two secret bits as well as to read two other secret bits. Our
protocol is shown to be asymptotically secure (i.e., the detection probability tends to 1 in the long-message limit)
against the disturbance attack, the intercept-and-resend attack as well as the entangle-and-measure attack. As in
the ping-pong protocol, our protocol is deterministic in the sense that, in the course of running, the participating
parties surely know which run is in MM and which run is in CM. While qubits in CM are deterministically discarded,
qubits in MM are read directly by both parties without a prior quantum key sharing. This looks like that Alice and
Bob are “talking” to each other bit by bit, much as though a dialogue is going on between them; so comes the name
“quantum dialogue”. In contrast to the ping-pong protocol here, thanks to the modification of CM, there is no need
for both Alice and Bob to do single-qubit measurements. Hence, our quantum dialogue protocol seems even more
feasible within present technologies as compared to the ping-pong protocol (see, e.g., the experimental feasibility of
the ping-pong protocol in [6]).
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